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I was Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board while I was preparing my 
Marshall Lectures for delivery at Cambridge in 1995. So I asked the Board staff to 
research what had been written about making monetary policy by committees—as 
opposed to by individuals. Although they were (and remain) a knowledgeable and 
thorough bunch, they unearthed almost nothing. So when I delivered the Robbins 
Lectures at the London School of Economics the following year,
1 this is what I concluded 
on the subject: 
My own hunch is that, on balance, the additional monetary policy inertia 
imparted by group decisionmaking provides a net benefit to society… But my 
main point is simpler: My experience as a member of the FOMC left me with 
a strong feeling that the theoretical fiction that monetary policy is made by a 
single individual maximizing a well-defined preference function misses 
something important. In my view, monetary theorists should start paying 
some attention to the nature of decisionmaking by committee, which is rarely 
mentioned in the academic literature. (Blinder (1998), p. 22) 
 
I made reference in that lecture to only one paper on the subject, Faust’s (1996) clever 
model of the seemingly-odd construction of the FOMC, though I should have cited 
Waller’s (1992) earlier work as well. (Mea culpa.) My point is that, up to then, there had 
been hardly any research on committee decisionmaking. 
Fortunately, that is no longer the case. By the time of my three Okun lectures at Yale 
in 2002 (Blinder (2004)), the subject merited a whole lecture, including references to 
about ten papers on the subject—and I missed some. (Mea culpa again.) The literature 
has continued to grow since then, including seven papers at a Netherlands Central Bank 
conference in 2005 and eleven papers at a Bank of Norway conference last year. The 
study of central banking by committee thus appears to be a growth industry, albeit a small 
one. 
                                                 
1 These were eventually published as Blinder (1998).   2
In this paper, I try to take stock of what we think we know—and what we do not 
know—about several questions that have been asked in this still-very-young literature. I 
also pose a few new questions. My jumping off point is two facts. 
1.  The data show an unmistakable trend toward more and more central banks 
making monetary policy decisions by committees rather than by single 
individuals (Blinder (2004), Chapter 2), which suggests that committee 
decisions are, for some reason(s), perceived to be superior.  
2.  Monetary policy committees (MPCs) come in a wide variety of shapes and 
sizes, suggesting either that the principal determinants of optimal committee 
design have yet to be pinned down, or that some of these determinants vary 
across nations--probably both. 
Regarding Fact 1, the choices made by a number of countries in the last 15 years or 
so indicate an evolving consensus that (a) the committee-versus-individual choice matters 
for monetary policy and (b) committees make superior decisions, on average. But Fact 2 
reveals that there is as yet no consensus on a host of important design issues. So I begin 
with Fact 1 but concentrate on Fact 2. 
 
1. Are committee decisions different? Better? 
Do the decisions of monetary policy committees differ systematically from those of 
individual central bankers? Notice that my opening quotation strongly suggested that they 
do and that, in particular, committee-based decisions are more consensual and more 
inertial and, for those reasons, possibly better. But is it true?   3
Subsequent experimental research by John Morgan and me (Blinder and Morgan, 
2005, 2007) has been kinder to the last part of this presumption than to the first. In two 
different experiments, one with 100 Princeton University students and the other with 252 
University of California, Berkeley students, we found clear evidence that committees 
(which were of sizes 4, 5, and 8 in the experiments) outperform individual 
decisionmakers in making simulated monetary policy. Lombardelli et al. (2005) found 
the same in a near-replication of our work using students at the London School of 
Economics.  
However, contrary to my 1996 suggestion, committees do not appear to acquire their 
edge by being more inertial. In fact, the most stunning finding of Blinder and Morgan 
(2005), which was subsequently replicated in Blinder and Morgan (2007), is that 
committees do not react more slowly (nor more quickly) to demand shocks than 
individuals do. Instead, they perform better because they make fewer mistakes—without 
taking longer to reach decisions.
2 One strong suggestion emerging from the experimental 
results is that there are genuine gains from group interactions. Committees do not just 
reflect the average opinions of their member. They do not simply follow the median voter 
rule. And they are not dominated by their most skilled members.
3 Instead, the group 
seems to generate some sort of collective wisdom that makes the whole somewhat greater 
than the sum of its parts. 
Anne Sibert (2006) recently disputed this conclusion, at least conceptually. She 
suggested two reasons why committees in general, and MPCs in particular, might 
                                                 
2 “Longer” in this context refers to how much data the decisionmaker requires before changing interest 
rates, not to the number of minutes of clock time that elapse in the experiment. We judged this to be the 
more relevant concept of time lag in the monetary policy context. Who really cares how many minutes the 
MPC meeting lasts? 
3 These are three findings from Blinder and Morgan (2005).   4
perform less well than individual decisionmakers. One is free-riding on the public-goods 
nature of macroeconomic information, which is related to what psychologists call “social 
loafing”—letting someone else do the work. The other is what is commonly called 
“group-think,” the psychological drive for consensus. 
Doubtless, there are many applications in which social loafing on a committee is 
important. Just think of the work of most faculty committees. But, in my view, it strains 
credulity to apply this idea to serving on a monetary policy committee. After all, that is 
typically the most important duty that each committee member has in his or her 
professional life. Rather than fostering social loafing, life on a MPC seems more likely to 
foster an atmosphere of competition and one-upmanship. In my personal experience on 
the FOMC, members (most of whom had large staffs) prepared assiduously for each 
meeting in order to make the most telling points and thereby, hopefully, to influence the 
opinions of other committee members—or, failing that, at least to sound well-informed 
and smart. 
Group-think is less easily dismissed. Sibert (2006) quotes disapprovingly my 
hunches that committees “laboriously aggregate individual preferences; that they need to 
be led; that they tend to adopt compromise positions on difficult questions” (Blinder 
(1998), p. 20)—all of which suggest that committees moderate the possibly-extreme 
views of individual members. Instead, she observes, group-think can sometimes lead 
committees to adopt decisions that no one would call moderate—as numerous military 
and foreign-policy misadventures attest.  
There is certainly evidence for group-think outside the realm of economics (cf. Janis 
(1982)). And there may even be examples of group-think in monetary policy. Alan   5
Greenspan (but not Ben Bernanke) certainly encouraged it on the FOMC; and some of us 
have a hard time believing that all 21 members of the ECB Governing Council always 
independently come to the same conclusion on everything. But, that said, I have a hard 
time thinking of examples in which group-think led a central bank to pursue horrendous 
monetary policy.
4 So I am not persuaded that we should let Sibert’s a priori arguments 
trump the experimental evidence to the contrary—not to mention the perceived successes 
of the Federal Open Market Committee, the former Bundesbank Council, and the ECB 
Governing Council. 
If committees really do outperform individuals, where and how do they acquire their 
edge? In Blinder (2004, Chapter 2), I suggested five main avenues: 
1.  A committee pools the knowledge, information, and forecasts of its members, 
leading to better decisions. 
2.  Committee members bring different methods of analysis and different ways 
of processing information (different “decision heuristics”) to the table, which 
benefits the group. 
3.  Where tradeoffs between conflicting goals are involved (e.g., between 
inflation and unemployment), committee decisionmaking probably 
“averages” (not necessarily literally) disparate preferences. 
4.  For all these reasons, and perhaps others, committees are less likely to adopt 
extreme positions, Sibert’s group-think hypothesis notwithstanding. 
                                                 
4 Some might claim that the inflationary policies followed by the Federal Reserve before Paul Volcker were 
an example of harmful group-think. But other central bankers, acting as individuals, were making similar 
mistakes at the same time. Nor were the attitudes of the pre-Volcker FOMC out of step with contemporary 
received wisdom.    6
5.  Similarly, policy made by a committee should be less volatile—although this 
argument is not borne out by the experimental evidence. 
Without conceding the point on #4, I am inclined to put the greatest weight on #1 
and especially #2. Economists like to think of central bankers as minimizing a well-
defined (and quadratic) social loss function subject to a known (up to stochastic elements) 
and stationary model of the economy. But each of the three italicized words in this 
sentence is wildly at variance with reality. No one really knows the loss function, and 
committee members may not agree on it.
5 MPC members certainly do not know—nor 
think they know—the true model of the economy. Nor, when pressed, would anyone 
really defend the stationarity assumption. Ill-defined optimization problems with 
unknown objective functions and unknown (and possibly changing) constraints do not 
lend themselves to classical optimization techniques, nor to perfect solutions. Instead, 
they are likely to benefit from the application of different decision heuristics (Hong and 
Page (2004)). 
Having tentatively concluded that committees are (a) different and (b) probably 
better, I turn in the rest of the paper to issues of committee design. If a nation wishes to 
exploit the advantages of committees over individuals, what kind of MPC should it 
create? 
 
2. Types of monetary policy committees 
Committees differ along a number of dimensions. In this section, I deal briefly with 
six: the degree of consensus achieved (or enforced), the strength of the committee’s 
leader, voting procedures (or the absence thereof), the committee’s size, its composition 
                                                 
5 Eliminating the possibility of disagreements over goals is one of the arguments for inflation targeting.   7
between “insiders” (that is, full-time employees of the bank) and “outsiders,” and how 
committee members are selected. 
Degree of consensus 
In a series of papers beginning with Blinder et al. (2001), I have suggested the 
following three-way classification of MPCs. An individualistic committee is founded on 
the principle of individual accountability. It does not insist on achieving consensus when 
that is difficult, but instead makes decisions by something approximating majority vote. It 
also often speaks with multiple voices. The Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank 
seem to be two examples of this stereotype. By contrast, a collegial committee is founded 
on the principle of group accountability. It strives for, indeed may insist on, a consensus 
decision that everyone on the committee can embrace; and it may or may not hold a 
formal vote. Such a committee generally speaks (figuratively, and perhaps literally) with 
a single voice.  
I have further suggested subdividing collegial committees into two types, according 
to how consensus is achieved. On an autocratically-collegial committee, the chairman 
more or less dictates the consensus, and the other members fall in line. The FOMC under 
Chairmen Burns, Volcker, and Greenspan (but not Bernanke) were clear examples.
6 The 
Bank of Norway may be another. (In deference to our hosts, I will let the Bank of Canada 
classify itself.) On a genuinely-collegial committee, the chairman is less dominant. 
Members basically agree in advance to reach a group decision, and then they accept the 
result even if they are not entirely happy with it. The ECB Governing Council is the most 
prominent contemporary example of this type. 
                                                 
6 FOMC votes do allow for dissenters. However, dissent is normally rare.   8
Which system works best? There is probably no single answer that works for all 
times and places. But I argued in Blinder (2004) that an individualistic committee is 
probably best suited to exploiting the advantages of committees over individuals—if it 
can solve the “cacophony problem” of speaking with too many (possibly conflicting) 
voices. Toward that end, it may be wise to throw a dash of collegiality into the mix. 
Does strong leadership improve decisionmaking? 
In choosing among individualistic, genuinely-collegial, and autocratically-collegial 
committee structures, one important consideration is how important it is to have a strong 
leader.
7 Almost by definition, the committee’s chair has the most power in an 
autocratically-collegial committee and the least in an individualistic committee, with 
genuinely-collegial committees ranging in between. But which arrangement leads to the 
best performance? 
There is no simple answer to this question. I have just suggested, on conceptual 
grounds, that something between an individualistic and a genuinely-collegial committee 
structure might be optimal. That blend seems to imply that the chairman does not 
dominate the proceedings. But even that tentative conclusion could easily be overturned 
by evidence that an MPC needs strong leadership to function well. Is there such 
evidence? 
It is possible to read the good track records of the Fed under, e.g., Volcker and 
Greenspan, and of the Bundesbank under, e.g., Poehl and Tietmeyer, as evidence in favor 
of this proposition. Indeed, the Fed has a longstanding tradition of dominance by its 
chairman (c.f. Blinder (1998) and Meyer (2004)). A number of empirical papers have 
                                                 
7 Heads of MPCs are variously called chairman (e.g., Fed), governor (e.g., Bank of Canada), or president 
(e.g., ECB). To economize on words, I’ll employ the American usage: chairman.   9
studied the role of the FOMC chairman. We know that Alan Greenspan tended to speak 
longer in FOMC meetings than the other members (Chappell et al., (2005)), and his 
domination of the committee was legendary. According to Chappell et al. (2004), the 
impact of Chairman Arthur Burns on policy decisions corresponded to a voting weight of 
40-50% of the whole committee. Romer and Romer (2004) argue that even chairmen who 
were not perceived as particularly able policymakers were influential.  
There is much less scholarly research on the role of the chairman in other countries. 
But it appears that the ECB, during its short history to date, has not been nearly as 
dominated by its presidents as the Fed has; and yet it has performed quite well. And the 
highly-individualistic, yet highly-successful, Bank of England MPC has even seen its 
chairman, Mervyn King, on the losing side of votes. So real-world results do not speak to 
the issue with any clear voice. Gerlach-Kristen (2007) constructs a theoretical model of 
the role of the chairman on the Bank of England’s individualistic MPC. By calibrating 
this model to fit the interest rates actually set by the MPC, and then simulating it, she 
concludes that the chairman does not have much impact on the path of the policy rate. 
Instead, he reduces the disagreement among committee members. 
One way in which the committee chair might try to dominate the decisionmaking 
process is to offer his opinions first (or even to inform other members of his views prior 
to the formal meeting), thus leaving other committee members the stark choice between 
going along and dissenting.
8 For example, Chairman Greenspan tended to speak and vote 
                                                 
8 Meade and Stasavage (2008) construct a model that compares incentives for members of a committee to 
voice dissent when deliberations occur in public versus in private. They find that the likelihood of having 
members accurately reveal their private information is greater when deliberation takes place in private. 
Empirically, they find evidence that FOMC members appear to have voiced less dissent since the 
committee’s decision to publish transcripts. 
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first at FOMC meetings, but Chairman Bernanke reportedly waits to speak and vote last. 
But the Fed is just one example. Most of the 31 MPCs surveyed by Maier (2007) do not 
operate with any fixed speaking order at meetings. 
One major concern related to group-think is avoiding what are called “information 
cascades.” The term refers to the increasing reluctance to dissent, and the mounting 
incentives to hide one’s private information, as more and more speakers express identical 
opinions (e.g., agree with the chairman)—which, if it happens, can extinguish 
information and stifle debate. Committee members want to appear well-informed, and 
they care about their reputations and careers. Being “wrong” damages both and, in an 
uncertain world, nobody knows what is really “right.” So there is a natural tendency (and 
an incentive) to “go along to get along.” As the cliché says, there’s safety in numbers.  
To overcome the tendency toward information cascades, some hierarchies and 
judicial systems operate with explicit anti-seniority rules. The idea is that, if more senior 
members speak later, more information will be extracted from the junior members, who 
can express their opinions freely without the disapprobation of more senior experts. But 
the anti-seniority rule is not always optimal. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) prove that 
there is no optimal speaking order when committee members have similar levels of 
expertise. They also show that, if there is a large variance in expertise across the 
committee, speaking in anti-seniority order may actually lead the committee to an inferior 
decision by incentivizing the most capable member to conceal his own private 
information.   
John Morgan and I (Blinder and Morgan, 2007) recently attacked the leadership 
issue experimentally. We found, much to our surprise, that ersatz MPCs comprised of   11
Berkeley students did not achieve higher scores when they had designated leaders versus 
when they did not. Whether this laboratory result applies to real-world MPCs is an 
open—and important—question which Blinder and Morgan (2007) discuss extensively. 
But resolving it econometrically seems a daunting (possibly impossible) task. 
Voting procedures 
Should (and do) MPCs make decisions by holding a formal vote? Making decisions 
by the unanimity principle versus by majority vote is a hardy perennial topic in the 
academic literature on group decisionmaking, much of which pertains to either elections 
or juries. The notion that majority voting is an efficient method way to aggregate 
information can be traced back all the way to Condorcet (1785).  Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer (1997) confirm the idea by showing that majority voting can achieve full 
information equivalence in large elections.  In a subsequent paper on voting rules in a 
jury setting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that a unanimity rule leads to a 
higher probability of acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent. Both results point 
toward majority voting. But Coughlan (2000) demonstrates that a unanimity rule can 
perform as well as any alternative rule in minimizing the probability of error in an 
environment in which jurors have similar preferences and can communicate effectively 
with each other. In other words, it is not so much the voting rule per se as the atmosphere 
of deliberation and the composition of the decisionmaking body.  
But does one voting rule consistently outperform the other in terms of aggregating 
information in the specific context of monetary policy? In Blinder and Morgan’s (2005) 
experiment, the results of the two voting rules were basically indistinguishable from one 
another. But they worried that this finding might be a consequence of the low stakes in the   12
experiment.
9 A theoretical paper by Gerlach-Kristen (2006) argues that voting outperforms 
averaging if there is uncertainty about the state of the economy—which, of course, there 
always is. 
Yet formal voting on MPCs is less common than might be imagined. In their well-
known survey of 94 central banks, Fry et al. (2000) found that, of the 79 that make 
decisions by committee, only 36 do so through formal voting. The other 43 reach decisions 
by consensus. 
If formal votes are held, should the results be disclosed to the public? It may seem that 
the answer is obviously “yes,” but disclosing individual votes might subject MPC members 
to political pressures, as Gersbach and Hahn (2005) show in a game-theoretic model of the 
ECB. However, Buiter (1999) argues that non-transparent voting reduces accountability 
and provides scope for undue influence, and Sibert (2003) finds that delaying the release of 
votes reduces welfare because it leads to less reputation building. So the theoretical issue 
seems open, though the burden of proof should rest on those who argue for secrecy. 
Committee size 
Real world MPCs vary greatly in size, ranging from a low of three members (at the 
Swiss National Bank) to a high of 21 (the ECB, so far). Table 1 shows the size distribution 
of monetary policy committees specified by law across a wide range of central banks in 
several recent years. While the distribution is quite spread out, there appears to be a pretty 






                                                 
9 Minority members did not want to hold the group up when unanimity was required.   13
Table 1 
Size Distribution of Central Bank Policy Boards 
 











3 or fewer  4  11  5 or fewer  23 
4-6 28  21  6-10  67 
7-9   50  49  11 or more  10 
10-12 10  13    
13 or more  8  6     
Source: Columns (1)-(2) come from Lybek and Morris (2004, Table 5), based on a 
sample of 50 central banks. Columns (1) and (3) come from Erhart and Vasquez-Paz 
(2007, Chart 1), based on a sample of 85 central banks. Columns (4)-(5) come from Fry et 
al. (2000, Chart 7.4), based on a sample of 82 banks. 
 
What determines optimal—or even actual—MPC size? The answer likely depends on 
a number of factors, including: 
•  the committee’s composition. If you want different types of people (e.g., 
economists, bankers, businesspeople, etc.) on the committee, you will need a 
larger committee. 
•  the committee’s scope. Committees responsible for multiple functions (e.g., 
bank supervision and regulation, payments systems, etc.) probably need to be 
larger than committees that only do monetary policy. (More on these two 
points below.) 
•  the desired degree of consensus. It is probably easier to achieve consensus on a 
smaller committee. 
•  the size of the country. Especially if there is rapid turnover among board 
members, small countries with large committees may find themselves 
exhausting the available talent pool.   14
•  the nature of the government that appoints it. For example, the multi-national 
character of the ECB probably dictates a large committee, as did the dispersed 
federal structure of the United States in 1913. 
A cross-sectional empirical study of actual (not necessarily optimal) committee size 
by Berger et al. (2006) found that MPCs tend to have more members in larger and more 
heterogeneous countries, those with democratic institutions, and those with flexible 
exchange rates. All this makes sense. Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) also find that larger 
country size leads to larger MPC size,
10 as does more volatile GDP; but they reverse 
Berger et al.’s finding on the exchange rate regime. 
Suppose the advantages of group decisionmaking derive largely from sharing 
information and employing different heuristics. If information sharing were literally 
costless and there were no coordination problems, bigger committees would necessarily be 
better.
11 But the implied enthusiasm for very large committees needs to be tempered by 
several mitigating factors. Obviously, coordination problems arise in large committees; 
even the sharing of information and opinions can become cumbersome. As just noted, if 
consensus is deemed important, very large committees may find that goal elusive. 
(However, the Fed and the ECB seem to find the task manageable.) And both shirking and 
group-think may be bigger problems on larger committees. 
Blinder and Morgan (2007) tested the performance of four-member versus eight-
member committees in an experimental setting, and found only small differences in either 
strategy or performance. (A slight edge in performance went to the larger committees, 
though it was generally not statistically significant.) Sibert (2006) suggested, only half 
                                                 
10 However, the slopes with respect to both GDP and population are very small; it takes 50 million more in 
population or $1.4 trillion more in GDP to raise MPC size by one just member. 
11 The Condorcet jury theorem, if taken literally, suggests extremely large committees.   15
tongue-in-cheek, that five-person committees are optimal. If she is right, Table 1 implies 
that most MPCs are too large. Alternatively, Table 1 can be interpreted as evidence that 
Sibert is wrong. 
Committee membership 
What sorts of people should sit on a monetary policy committee? One part of the 
answer seems to be simple: Since we want central banks to be independent, monetary 
policy should be made by technocrats, not by politicians. So members of the government 
should not be on the MPC.  This dictum is widely accepted these days. Or is it? 
According to Lybek and Morris (2004), nearly half of the 101 central banks surveyed 
allow government officials—in most cases, ministers of finance or their representatives—
to participate in MPC meetings.  But in about half of those cases, the government’s 
representative can vote. Increasingly, however, government officials are explicitly 
excluded from becoming MPC members, as a way to guarantee central bank autonomy.  
The recent brouhaha over the appointment of a new governor of the Bank of Japan was a 
stunning case in point. So I think it is safe to declare the exclusion of finance or treasury 
representatives from the MPC as part of “best practice”—even though it is not always 
followed. 
But beyond that, what else can we say? Some of my fellow economists seem to 
believe the answer is simple. Contrary to the old adage that war is too important to be left 
to the generals, they believe that monetary policy should be made by a bunch of skilled, 
technical economists who know how to minimize the expected value of a quadratic loss 
function subject to a linear, stochastic model—people like Ben Bernanke, Mervyn King, 
Stanley Fischer, and Lars Svensson, to name a few stellar examples. I hate to dissent   16
from this self-satisfied view, and in some sense I don’t. And besides, the real-world trend 
does appear to be moving in that direction.
12 But before we macroeconomists become too 
smug, let me point out two things.  
Conceptually, if you believe that the main benefits from having decisions made by a 
committee (rather than by an individual) derive from different ways of thinking, then 
having only Ph.D. macroeconomists on the MPC may not be the best recipe. Empirically, 
think of the leadership of the Fed as an example. Concentrating on accomplished research 
economists would have eliminated both Paul Volcker, who was a government official for 
many years, and Alan Greenspan, who was a business economist with tight political 
connections, from consideration while accepting the distinguished academic Arthur 
Burns. So, happy as I am to see my brilliant friend Ben Bernanke at the helm of the Fed, I 
don’t necessarily believe that publishing a lot of notable scholarly work on monetary 
economics is the best possible credential for a central banker. 
Neither, of course, did the founders of the Federal Reserve, which has the world’s 
oldest central bank committee. The Federal Reserve Act (1913) directs the President of 
the United States to appoint the seven-person Board of Governors in Washington with 
“due regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and 
commercial interests, and geographical divisions of the country”—which doesn’t sound 
much like a description of the NBER macro group. Appointments of the 12 district bank 
presidents are even more complicated since each is chosen (with the approval of the 
Board of Governors) by the bank’s board of directors: a nine-person body comprised of 
                                                 
12 When President Bill Clinton appointed me as Vice Chairman of the Fed in 1994, I believe I was only 
about the fourth or fifth career academic (depending on how you define that term) to be appointed to the 
board in its 80 year history. Since then, there have been seven more academics out of 12 new appointments. 
This looks like a regime change to me.   17
three directors “chosen by and representative of the stockholding banks,” three directors 
“designated by the Board of Governors… with due but not exclusive consideration to the 
interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor and consumers,” and three 
members “who shall represent the public” and are to be chosen with those same interest 
groups in mind. Whew!  
In short, the founders of the Fed sought to entrust its decisions (no one in 1913 called 
it “monetary policy”) to “men of affairs” (no one was thinking of women then) with a 
broad variety of life experiences and points of view. The Maastricht Treaty, which came 
almost 80 years later, placed more faith in the virtues of specialists. It specified that ECB 
Executive Board members should be “persons of recognized standing and professional 
experience in monetary or banking matters,” which still does not require trained 
economists.  
In thinking about the choice between technical monetary economists and others, it is 
worth remembering that members of the Fed’s Open Market Committee and the ECB’s 
Governing Council have duties other than monetary policy to perform. And specialists in 
monetary economics probably have no particular comparative advantage in, say, bank 
supervision or running a bank or a government bureaucracy. Nor are the Fed and the ECB 
unusual in this respect. Giving central bankers multiple roles is the norm, not the 
exception.
13 My own experience on the Federal Reserve Board taught me that it is useful 
to have colleagues with more experience in banking, and in financial business in general, 
than academics normally have—even if these colleagues don’t understand linear-
quadratic models. Indeed, it seems axiomatic that the composition of a committee should 
depend on the tasks it is assigned to perform. There is little systematic evidence on how 
                                                 
13 The Bank of England’s MPC seems to be the most prominent exception.   18
the scope of a central bank board’s responsibilities varies across the globe, but we know 
that it does vary.     
The fact that most central banks perform a variety of tasks raises a related question: 
Should all members of the MPC be officers of the bank (“insiders”), or is it better to have 
some “outsiders” who have specialized knowledge of, e.g., monetary policy? Practices 
vary. The British MPC is explicitly divided into five internal and four external members. 
At the Fed, all 19 FOMC members are “insiders,” as long as you count the 12 district 
bank presidents that way (as you should).
14 The ECB’s insider-outsider structure is harder 
to characterize. The six-member Executive Board works at headquarters in Frankfurt, but 
they are not ECB careerists. The other members of the Governing Council are the heads 
of the 15 (and growing) constituent national central banks—a mix of careerists (but at 
their own institutions) and non-careerists. 
Which mix works best? I find this a hard question to answer. On the one hand, real 
benefits—such as the avoidance of group-think—accrue from bringing fresh, diverse 
points of view into the committee room. That observation suggests including some 
outsiders who are less invested in the bank’s party line; and indeed, outsiders do dissent 
more frequently than insiders on the British MPC.
15 On the other hand, I find it hard to 
see how a part-time outsider, who is still pursuing some other occupation, can be fully 
insulated from what might be called incidental conflicts of interest (e.g., everyone is 
affected by interest rates) and/or from making news inadvertently while outside the 
                                                 
14 In fact, a number of the presidents are typically Fed careerists, whereas relatively few governors in 
Washington are. In recent decades, the only one has been Donald Kohn. 
15 See, among others, Gerlach-Kristen (2007). At the Fed, district bank presidents also dissent more 
frequently than governors. See Meade and Sheets (2005).   19
cocoon of the central bank. So if there are to be “outsiders” on an MPC, I believe they 
should be full-time public servants, which is the Fed model.
16 
Looking empirically at the composition of actual MPCs doesn’t help much. Not only 
do the membership ranks include academics, career central bankers, representatives of 
the banking/business community, and representatives of ministries, but sometimes these 
lines are hard to draw. According to a recent survey of 31 MPCs by Maier (2007), 17 of 
them have only career central bankers whereas 14 have both internal and external 
members. Looking at some prominent central banks, the Bank of England’s MPC has a 
diverse (internal plus external) membership comprised of academics, business 
representatives, and career central bankers, whereas Maier classifies—incorrectly, I 
would say—the FOMC and the Bank of Japan’s MPC as being made up solely of central 
bankers. While the members of the ECB Governing Council come from different nations, 
they are mostly career central bankers. 
     Appointment procedures 
Appointment and removal procedures are relevant to the considerations just 
discussed (what sorts of people should be on MPCs?), and also to the delicate balance 
between ensuring central bank independence, on the one hand, and enhancing democratic 
accountability and legitimacy, on the other. The former suggests that appointments to 
monetary policy committees should be made by the politically-responsible authorities, 
which could mean either the president or prime minister (or, as in the British case, his 
agent) or the legislature or parliament, depending on how a country is governed. But it 
does rule out self-perpetuating oligarchies. 
                                                 
16 Making all members full-timers, incidentally, probably implies giving them others tasks to perform 
because thinking about monetary policy is probably not a full-time job—as long as the central bank has 
ample staff resources.    20
Central bank independence also points to long terms of office as one way to shield 
monetary policy from political pressures. In their survey of 101 central banks, Lybek and 
Morris (2004) found that 66% have fixed terms of four years or more. In one extreme 
case, governors of the US Federal Reserve Board have fourteen-year terms. Almost no 
Fed governors, however, actually serve a full term. ECB Executive Board terms run eight 
years but, at least so far, most members serve their terms out.
17  
Table 2, which is based on Moutot et al. (2008), shows an international comparison 
of the appointments and terms of office of MPC members at eight rich-country central 
banks. The long terms are evident, while renewability varies. 
Table 2 
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As important as central bank independence is, it cannot be absolute in a democracy. 
There should, for example, be some ultimate political check on the authority of the 
central bank—for example, by giving the elected government the ability to fire MPC 
members or to take back some of the central bank’s power under extreme 
                                                 
17 However, because of the staggered terms granted at the outset, only Otmar Issing has actually served 
eight years.     21
circumstances.
18 But since this “nuclear option” will rarely, if ever, be invoked, it seems 
wise to have some milder way to mitigate the “democracy deficit.” Giving the power to 
appoint central bank officials to politicians who must stand for election seems a good 
option. 
Different countries have apparently balanced these considerations in different ways. 
As mentioned earlier, seven members of the FOMC are politically appointed by the 
President of the United States (with Senate confirmation) to terms that are 14 years long 
de jure but much shorter de facto. But the other twelve FOMC members are not 
political appointees. Similarly, six members of the ECB’s Governing Council are 
appointed “by common accord” of the heads of government for eight-year terms, while 
the other 15 are appointed by national authorities—in a variety of ways and for terms of 
different length.  
Staggering of terms is sometimes adopted to ensure the institutional continuity of 
monetary policy making, to reduce the level of politicization, and perhaps even to reduce 
the tendency toward group-think by regularly introducing new members. Using a game-
theoretic approach, Tabellini (1987) first showed that staggered terms can provide 
reputational incentives so that a finitely-lived committee with overlapping terms can 
operate as if there will never  be a “last period.” Waller (1992) later rationalized 
staggering as a way to reduce political swings from dovishness to hawkishness as a result 
of elections. Despite these arguments, and despite the prominent examples of the ECB 
and the Fed, staggering has not been adopted by the majority of MPCs. Among the 
central banks surveyed by Lybek and Morris, for example, only about 20% use de jure 
                                                 
18 On this, see Lohmann (1992).  In the US case, extreme circumstances are not even required. The 
Congress can end the Federal Reserve’s independence any day it chooses.   22
staggered terms. However, occasional vacancies and renewability of terms create some 
de facto staggering. 
 
3. Committees and communication 
In a recent paper (Blinder, 2007), I made a fairly obvious point that seems not to 
have been made before: Because monetary policy committees are so different, they 
probably need to communicate in different ways. In particular, central banks with 
individual decisionmakers, autocratically-collegial committees, genuinely-collegial 
committees, and individualistic committees probably each need different styles of 
communication. A few examples will illustrate why.
19 
Start with the statement released immediately following a monetary policy meeting 
and the subsequent release of the minutes. I pair the two because, in a real sense, they are 
substitutes. An autocratically-collegial committee should be able to deliver a detailed and 
coherent explanation of its action immediately. After all, the chairman almost certainly 
knows the outcome before the meeting starts. If the statement is sufficiently long and 
detailed, there is little need for detailed minutes and no rush to produce them. The 
minutes will not contain much market-relevant information, anyway. 
But things may be quite different at the end of a meeting of a genuinely-collegial 
committee. First, the chairman may not know the outcome of the meeting in advance, 
which clearly prevents him from drafting an explanatory statement beforehand. And 
drafting a detailed statement by committee in real time is quite a challenge. Second, while 
committee members may all agree on the decision, they may disagree over the reasoning 
                                                 
19 For more details, see Blinder (2007, pp. 116-120).   23
behind it.
20 If so, issuing a detailed statement right after the meeting might be quite 
difficult, leaving a terse statement as the only viable alternative. In such cases, the 
minutes assume greater importance and need to be released sooner and to be more 
detailed. 
The immediate communication problem is even more acute for an individualistic 
committee, whose decisions are apt to be non-unanimous. And even if everyone votes the 
same way, members are likely to disagree over the rationales. In a situation like that, 
agreeing on an immediate explanatory statement may prove to be impossible. In the 
absence of such a statement, the entire burden of explanation falls on the minutes, which 
must therefore be quite detailed and should be released as soon as possible. 
A second pertinent example is the disclosure of forward-looking information, up to 
and including a projection of future central bank decisions—which the central banks of 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland now publish. In principle, this task is far 
easier for an individual central banker acting alone, or for an autocratically-collegial 
committee, than for either of the other two types. The chairman of an autocratically-
collegial committee presumably has a good idea of what he is likely to do in the future, 
and he can reveal information about it if he so chooses. Late in his tenure as Fed 
chairman, Alan Greenspan did this regularly, albeit in a highly stylized way. 
But the chairman of a genuinely-collegial committee holds a less commanding 
position. When decisions are difficult, he may not be able to predict where the committee 
will go, nor when. And other committee members almost certainly will not want him to 
foreclose their options. Since no central bank can be expected to reveal what it does not 
                                                 
20 Indeed, the honest rationale for some members might be “because everyone else wanted to.”    24
know, such a committee may be limited to vague indications of its “bias” or perceived 
“balance of risks,” which is what the ECB and the Fed typically offer. 
Revealing forward-looking information is, of course, most difficult for an 
individualistic committee, where members not only may but probably do hold different 
views on where monetary policy should be heading—some of which they may make 
public. If no agreement on future plans can be reached, then nothing can be revealed. On 
the other hand, the votes of an individualistic committee may be much more informative 
about future intentions than are the votes of collegial committees. Votes should therefore 
be published immediately, naming names. 
The size of the committee may also affect an MPC’s communication strategy. While 
the difficulties are often exaggerated, it is harder for a larger group to agree on wording. 
Indeed, this appears to be a severe practical problem right now for the FOMC, which 
issues a brief statement after each meeting. Even though these statements are terse and 
stylized, committee members reportedly have a hard time agreeing on the wording—
leading to the exchange of numerous drafts. And the words sometimes leave people 
puzzled anyway. It may be that issuing, say, a coherent 500-word explanatory statement 
is literally beyond the FOMCs current capabilities.  
If this conundrum is genuine, it raises a delicate chicken-egg issue. I have 
emphasized that the decision on committee size may dictate some aspects of the 
communication policies. But if a monetary policy committee is so large that it cannot 
communicate clearly, effectively, and honestly, maybe it is too large. 
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4. Whose forecasts? 
One specific type of information that most central banks release, at least occasionally 
and partially, are forecasts of key macroeconomic variables such as inflation, 
unemployment, and output (or even output gaps). Public inflation forecasts are 
particularly important under inflation targeting. But regardless of the central bank’s 
target(s), forecasts of the outlook under both changed and unchanged monetary policy 
are among the most crucial inputs to monetary policy decisions, whether made by an 
individual or a committee,. So transparency seems to dictate that central banks release (at 
least portions of) those forecasts.  
That said, committee decisionmaking raises some specific and vexing issues. For 
starters, whose forecast should be released? A first distinction is between forecasts of the 
committee, if they exist, and forecasts of the central bank staff. To the extent that the two 
differ, the former are presumably more tightly linked to policy decisions than the latter. 
So let’s start there. 
In what sense can a committee, especially a large committee like the FOMC or the 
ECB Governing Council, actually be said to make a numerical forecast, especially a 
detailed one? That is a good question, and the answer is related to some of the issues 
raised earlier, such as how large the MPC should be and what sorts of people should be 
on it. 
At the technical level, macroeconomic forecasts are almost always generated by 
teams. So a relatively small MPC comprised of technically-minded economists should be 
able to develop a forecast which it collectively “owns.” In such cases, the MPCs forecast 
is surely the right one to release. But if the committee is large and/or if its members lack   26
expertise in macroeconomics and forecasting, agreement on the forecast can become 
either elusive or illusory—perhaps both. 
Current FOMC forecasts, which are now released four times a year, are a good 
example. The published committee forecasts present the range and central tendency 
(which means excluding the three highest and three lowest) of the forecasts submitted by 
each of the 19 FOMC members. But members never meet (nor even email) to try to iron 
out (or even understand) the differences among their forecasts. Instead, they each 
generate forecasts under their own favorite (and often unstated) assumptions about 
exogenous variables such as oil prices, government spending, and foreign economic 
growth. They even make their own assumptions about future monetary policy! And while 
the district bank presidents each have large staffs to do the forecasting work, the 
governors in Washington (other than the chairman) do not. The resulting “projections” 
are thus a curious hodge-podge which is hard to interpret—although showing the entire 
distribution (as the FOMC now does) helps a bit. 
Could the forecast exercise be done better? I am sure the answer is yes. But the fact 
remains that a 19-member committee will find it hard to agree on a long list of numbers, 
even if most of them are Ph.D. economists, as is true on the FOMC today. If you add a 
bunch of people who carry dramatically different intellectual baggage into the room, 
agreement may become even more elusive. In such cases, the staff forecast might be a 
sensible focal point. 
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5. A Summing Up 
It seems probable that more thinking has gone into the question of what a monetary 
policy committee should look like over the last decade than over the preceding century. 
While we have not yet reached agreement on everything, and may never do so, one way 
to sum up this talk is to ask what might be considered “best practice” right now. If you 
were a country currently thinking about redesigning your monetary policy apparatus, 
what sort of monetary policy committee would you set up? Posing this question is 
probably also a good way to provoke my discussants into disagreements. 
To begin with the most obvious point, I think you would choose to have a MPC 
rather than a single policymaker. The weight of both theory and evidence—plus, of 
course, international practice—points strongly in that direction. The optimal size for your 
MPC is less clear. While 7-9 members seems to be the most popular choice around the 
world, a small country might find it challenging to staff a committee of, say, nine, 
especially if turnover is rapid.
21 You also should not make the committee so large that it 
finds it difficult to communicate clearly and in some detail. As mentioned, your 
communication strategy—including the type of forecast you publish—needs to be 
custom-tailored to the nature and structure of your committee. 
In terms of committee type, I believe you would try to strike a balance between the 
virtues of diversity that are the hallmark of an individualistic committee and the clarity of 
communication that is the virtue of a genuinely-collegial committee—that is, wind up 
somewhere between the Bank of England and the ECB. The virtues of diversity suggest 
that not all members need to be specialists in monetary economics. The virtues of 
                                                 
21 The UK, which is not a small country, has had foreign nationals and foreign residents on its MPC.   28
collegiality, plus the research I have mentioned, suggest that it is not essential to have a 
dominant chairman. 
All committee members should be appointed by the government, although precisely 
what that means must depend on the details of the country’s system of governance. If the 
legal arrangements imply individual accountability, then voting records should be in the 
public domain. But if the MPC has group accountability only, then there is a case for 
withholding that information.  
I also believe that every MPC member should be a full-time employee of the central 
bank—which is certainly the international norm. However, it may be best—as a 
safeguard against group-think—if bank careerists constitute only a minority of the 
committee’s membership. A committee comprised of a healthy blend of monetary policy 
specialists (the majority) and a few others is probably advisable in most cases.
22 
Many of you may now be comparing your own country’s practices to this abstract 
standard of “best practice.” In the case of the United States, the comparison looks pretty 
favorable to the FOMC, but with four exceptions. First, the Fed chairman may have been 
too dominant, and the rest of the committee too passive, historically. Interestingly, Ben 
Bernanke seems to have changed that. Second, a 19-member committee is probably too 
large. Third, only a minority of the FOMC membership is politically appointed. And 
fourth, the Fed does not communicate often or clearly enough. 
It need hardly be said that each of these judgments on what constitutes best practice 
is tentative, based partly on the research to date and partly on experience. Further 
research may temper or even overturn some of them. And more research is certainly 
needed. 
                                                 
22 The main exception would be if monetary policy is the committee’s sole responsibility.   29
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